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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 990236-CA
vs.
NORM SMITH,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appealsfromconvictions for using a concealed weapon in the commission
of a crime of violence, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501,
504(3) (1995), and two counts of aggravated assault, both third degree felonies, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995).1 This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was defendant denied his Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses on his behalf

and to confront the witnesses against him?

defendant has not challenged on appeal his conviction for interfering with a
lawful arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995).
See Aplt. Brf.
1

Standard of Review. When reviewing a trial court decision to not allow a defendant
to call a witness or to limit the cross-examination of a witness, the appellate court "review[s]
the legal rule applied for correctness and the application of the rule to the facts for an abuse
of discretion." See State v. Chavez, 2002 UT App 9, f 17, 41 P.3d 1137 (reviewing a trial
court's limit on cross-examination); see also State v. Byrns, 911 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah App.
1995) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the trial court's finding that defendant had not
demonstrated that a witness was material to the case under the Sixth Amendment).
2.

Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for carrying a

concealed weapon in the commission of a crime of violence?
Standard of Review. The court affords great deference to the jury verdict and will not
reverse a conviction unless "the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable
[minds] could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980).
3.

Did the trial court properly refuse to merge the aggravated assault charges with

the concealed weapons charge?
Standard of Review. Whether the aggravated assault convictions should merge with
the concealed weapons conviction is a legal question reviewed for correctness. See State v.
Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 37, — Utah Adv. Rep —.
4.

Was defense counsel ineffective for not requesting an instruction on threatening

with a dangerous weapon as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault and was it plain
error for the trial court not to give such an instruction sua sponte?

2

Standard of Review—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

When a defendant is

represented by new counsel on appeal and the record is otherwise adequate to review a
defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court will review those claims
as a matter of law. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998); State v. Vessey, 967
P.2d 960, 964 (Utah App. 1998). In evaluating an ineffectiveness claim, the Court
"'indulgefs] in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990)
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct 2052,2065 (1984)).
Standard of Review—Plain Error. Where a defendant raises an issue for the first time
on appeal, this Court will not reverse a conviction based on that claim unless the defendant
demonstrates plain error or exceptional circumstances. See Bluff, 2002 UT 66, at J 25 see
also Utah R. Evid. 103(d). However, this Court will not save the defendantfromany alleged
error if defendant made a conscious decision not to seek the relief or otherwise led the trial
court into error. See Bluff, 2002 UT App 66, at f 25.
5.

Was defendant denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel when his counsel did not move for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case
on the ground that the State introduced no evidence that defendant did not have a concealed
weapons permit?
Standard ofReview. See standard of review for ineffective assistance under issue 4
above.

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are relevant to a
determination of this case and are reproduced in relevant part in Addendum A: U.S. Const,
amend. VI; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1995).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant was charged with using a concealed weapon during the commission of a
crime of violence, two counts of aggravated assault, and interfering with a peace officer
making a lawful arrest. R. 1-2. He was bound over for trial on all four counts at a
preliminary hearing. R. 16-17, 20-21, 26-27. Although he was represented by courtappointed counsel,2 defendant filed a plethora of pro se motions over the course of the next
two and one-half years, most of which were denied. See generally R. 12-67%? Defendant's
2

Defendant had at least five different court-appointed attorneys. His original
attorney, Douglas T. Terry, withdrew after defendant filed a bar complaint against him, R.
51, 54; Tom Blakely withdrew because he had previously been approached professionally
by an individual involved in a property dispute with defendant, R. 61-62; Lamar J.
Winward withdrew for unspecified reasons, but with defendant's express concurrence, R.
121-25; O'Dean Bowler withdrew after defendant sued him in federal court, R. 368-70,
373-75; and Kenneth L. Combs served as counsel through the trial, R. 422-23, 931-35.
3

Pro se motions filed by defendant included, but were not limited to, motions
asking the court to declare whether it was proceeding under common law, equity law, or
maritime law, R. 12-13, 322-24,493-99; an objection to the assignment of a magistrate
for the preliminary hearing, R. 15; a motion to dismiss the case for an alleged illegal ex
parte communication between the trial judge and defendant's counsel, R. 355-58; motions
seeking the recusal of Judge G. Rand Beacham for alleged bias, R. 349, 391, 653; a
motion to quash the affidavit of probable cause, R. 598-601; motions to dismiss based on
disputed evidence, R. 185-86, 251-52, 318-19, 446-48, 512-16; motions to dismiss and
4

counsel also filed a motion to suppress evidence and to dismiss the case. R. 328-39. Those
motions were denied. See R. 589, 615-22.
Following afive-daytrial, a jury convicted defendant of all four counts as charged.
R. 724-25; R. 933: 1156-57. Thereafter, defendant, through counsel, moved for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. R. 727-30. Defendant subsequentlyfiled,pro se, an amended
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new trial. R. 745-47,75173. Those motions were denied. R. 779-80. Following a 70-day diagnostic evaluation, R.
784-87, defendant was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years in prison for carrying a concealed
weapon, zero-to-five years in prison for each aggravated assault conviction, and six months
in jail for interfering with a lawful arrest. R. 829-31. The court suspended the sentence and
placed defendant on supervised probation for 36 months, subject to a jail commitment of 60
days, the payment of a $2,000 fine, and various other conditions. R. 831-33. Defendant
timely appealed. R. 835-36. The trial court has since terminated his supervised probation.
R. 920 (located in manila envelope marked "Supp. Index & Pleading")
SUMMARY OF FACTS

Prelude
On the morning of April 9,1996, defendant and hisfriendClayton Call drove their
motorcycles to a piece of property in Virgin, Utah to feed defendant's horses that were being

suppress based on various other theories, R. 133-35, 162-64, 292-94, 297-302, 305-06,
309-10, 313-15, 361-63,449-72, 483-92, 500-11, 517-20, 571-80; and motions for the
appointment of an investigator, R. 30 (granted, R. 39-41), a legal researcher, R. 344-46,
537-39; afingerprintexpert, R. 270-71, 435-36 (granted, R. 613-14, 623), and an expert
on police procedures and weapons, R. 586-87.
5

kept at the property. R. 933: 872; R. 931: 713. Defendant claimed that upon his arrival he
discovered that his personal property there had been vandalized and that some of it was
missing. R. 933: 872; R. 931: 714. Suspecting involvement by members of a family with
whom defendant had been feuding over the property, defendant and hisfriendleft to look for
his missing property at Coal Pits Mountain. R. 933: 872-73; R. 931: 715. When Call's
motorcycle broke down, defendant rode his motorcycle to the inn, owned by Call's mother
and where defendant and his family were residing, to retrieve Call's automobile. R. 933:
872-73,956-57; R. 931: 715-16. Before leaving the inn to pick up Call, defendant retrieved
his pistol and placed it in a holster on his waist. R. 933: 874, 881. After defendant picked
up Call, the two drove to a local bar where defendant telephoned his wife, directing her to
report the incident to police. R. 933: 874; R. 931: 717-18. The two then returned to the
property in Virgin between noon and 1:00. R. 933: 873; R. 931: 717-18, 781-82.
Defendant and Call stood guard at the property for the next several hours. R. 933:
963. During that time, defendant and Call retrieved several items from an underground
cellar, including two rifles and boxes of ammunition which they placed in a partiallyconstructed building. R. 931: 783-84. After a few hours, defendant drove to a local bar to
verify that his wife had called police. R. 933: 877; R. 931: 720. When he returned, he spoke
to a couple of neighbors, including Ron Felton. R. 933: 1068. During the conversation,
defendant declared that 'the only good cop is a dead cop." R. 933:1068. Some time before
4:00, defendant began pacing up and down the property and throwing dirt clods at Felton's
home, prompting Felton's wife Sharon to call 9-1-1. R. 933: 1065.

6

The Standoff and Aggravated Assault.
Near 4:00 that afternoon, Call left in his car. R. 933: 959-60. However, when he saw
that deputiesfromthe sheriffs office were on their way up to the property, Call returned and
notified defendant of their impending arrival. R. 933:959-60; R. 931: 722-24. At about that
time, Mrs. Felton observed defendant pull his shirt up and over his gun. R. 933: 1066-69.
Shortly thereafter, Deputies Johnny Owen and Lorin Orvin from the Washington County
Sheriffs Office pulled up to the property in their cars. R. 935: 271-75,332, 500-02. After
the two deputies exited their vehicles, Deputy Owen advised defendant that they had received
a complaint he was brandishing a weapon. R. 935: 279. When Deputy Owen asked
defendant if he had a weapon, defendant lifted up his shirt to expose his pistol and placed his
hand on the butt of the gun. R. 935: 281-82, 323; R. 931: 520-21. Deputy Owen asked
defendant to surrender the gun, but defendant refused, indicating that he was always arrested
by police when they responded to a complaint. R. 935: 282-84, 323; R. 931: 524.
Deputy Call slowly moved toward defendant, repeatedly asking him to surrender the
gun, but defendant backed away. R. 935: 283; R. 931: 522-25. Meanwhile, Deputy Orvin
removed his gunfromits holster and held it so that it was concealedfromview. R. 931: 52223. During the exchange, defendant was upset and agitated, which agitation gradually
increased during the encounter. R. 935:284. After a few moments and without provocation,
defendant turned and ran to the partially-constructed building, entering through an open
window frame. R. 935: 285-86, 305; R. 931: 525. The deputies pursued him, positioning
themselves just outside two separate windows. R. 935: 305, 308, 312; R. 931: 526-27.

7

In the building, defendant attempted to hide the rifles in the building and concealed
himself behind several garbage bins and other miscellaneous debris in the room. R. 935:
309,318-19; R. 931: 527;R.933: 892. The deputies tried to persuade defendant to surrender
his weapon. R. 935: 309,312; R. 931: 531. When defendant responded that he could shoot
the officers, Deputy Orvin told defendant that although he may very well shoot one of them,
the other would shoot him before defendant could shoot them both. R. 935: 309, 323; R.
931:544. Defendant then dropped to his knees and pointed his gun directly at Deputy Orvin.
R. 935: 310-11; R. 931: 531. Deputy Orvin immediately dove for cover under the window
and radioed for additional assistance. At that point, Deputy Owen drew his weapon on
defendant, who crouched further behind the garbage cans. R. 935: 310-11.
Defendant surrendered after several minutes of negotiation, putting the gun down on
one of the garbage cans infrontof him. R. 935: 313-14; R. 931: 532-33. R. 935: 314; R.
931: 533. After arresting defendant, Deputy Owen returned to the building where he
retrieved defendant's pistol and the two other guns in the building, as well as the boxes of
ammunition. R. 935: 315,320-22; R. 931: 533. Defendant was thereafter transported to the
jail in St. George for booking. R. 931: 545. After the booking process was complete,
defendant acknowledged to Deputy Orvin that they could have shot him and thanked him for
not doing so. R. 931: 545.

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Sixth Amendment Right to Call and Confront Witnesses, Defendant

contends that his Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses in his favor was violated when the
trial court did not permit him to call Ron Felton to rebut the testimony of Sharon Felton.
However, defendant did not ask to call Ron Felton to discredit Sharon Felton's testimony,
but to testify regarding defendant's emotional state 30-40 minutes before deputies arrived.
The trial court properly denied that request as irrelevant- Indeed, Sharon Felton had not yet
testified when defendant sought Ron Felton's testimony. Because defendant did not ask that
he be allowed to call Ron Felton to rebut Sharon Felton's testimony, his Sixth Amendment
claim fails.
Defendant also contends that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses
against him was violated when the trial court imposed a time limit on his cross-examination
of Deputy Orvin. Reasonable time limits on cross-examination do not offend the Sixth
Amendment. Where, as here, the defendant has had a reasonable opportunity to pursue the
matters on direct and otherwise impeach the witness, his confrontationrightsare not violated.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Defendant claims that the evidence was

insufficient to demonstrate that he intentionally concealed his weapon. Defendant's
argument fails for several reasons. First, because the concealed weapons statute does not
specify a mental state, the State was only required to show intent, knowledge, or
recklessness. Second, defendant ignores the evidence that supports a finding of intentional

9

conduct. For example, Sharon Felton testified that although defendant usually wears his shirt
tucked in, he pulled it up and over his gun just prior to the deputies' arrival.
Defendant also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the statute requires that the
concealed weapon be concealed during the commission of the crime. However, any error
here, if any, cannot constitute plain error inasmuch as no appellate decision has interpreted
the statute's requirement. In any event, the statute is reasonably read to only require that
incident to a crime of violence the weapon is later exposed and used during the commission
of the crime.
III. Merger, Defendant argues that the aggravated assault convictions should merge
with the conviction for the offense of using a concealed weapon during the commission of
a crime. However, applying the analysis set forth in State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah
1990), this claim fails. The second degree felony offense is an enhancement statute, different
in nature than other criminal statutes. Moreover, a review of the statute and its purpose
reveals that the legislature did not intend that aggravated assault and the other aggravating
offenses merge with the concealed weapons conviction. To find otherwise would not only
require the merger of aggravated assault, but also the merger of the greater offenses of rape,
murder, and aggravated murder. Such a result stands against logic and reason and is contrary
to the statute's deterrent purpose.
IV. Lesser Included Instruction. Defendant complains that the trial court did not
give an instruction on threatening with a dangerous weapon, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506
(1995), as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. He argues that his counsel was
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constitutionally deficient in not requesting the instruction and that the trial court's failure to
give the instruction sua sponte was plain error. Under either theory, however, defendant's
claim fails because a decision not to request such an instruction might properly be considered
sound trial strategy. A defendant might ratherriska conviction for the greater offense, than
risk giving the jury yet another theory upon which to convict him.
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Defendant argues that his counsel was
ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict based on the State's failure to introduce
evidence that defendant did not have a concealed weapons permit. However, because a
motion for a directed verdict would inevitably have been followed by a motion to reopen the
case, defendant can show no prejudice. Defendant admitted on cross-examination that he did
not have a concealed weapons permit and implicitly admitted that fact throughout the
proceedings. Accordingly, the State would have had little difficulty introducing evidence
that defendant had no permit once the case was reopened.
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ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
CALL WITNESSES ON HIS BEHALF AND TO CONFRONT THE
WITNESSES AGAINST HIM
In his first point on appeal, defendant lodges two complaints based on the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. First, he complains that he was denied his
Sixth Amendmentrightto call witnesses on his behalf when the trial court refused to permit
him to call Ron Felton as a witness to discredit the testimony of his wife Sharon Felton.
Aplt. Brf. at 17-19. Second, defendant complains that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to confront the witnesses against him when the trial court imposed a time limitation on
his cross-examination of Deputy Lorin Orvin. Aplt. Brf. at 19-23. Both claims fail.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO CALL WITNESSES IN HIS FAVOR.

Defendant "asserts that he was denied [his Sixth Amendment]rightto call Ron Felton
in his behalf to contradict Sharon Felton's testimony." Aplt. Brf. at 19. Because defendant
never asked to call Ron Felton to contradict Sharon Felton's testimony, his claim fails.
After defendant rested, the State called Sharon Felton to rebut the testimony of
defendant. See R. 933:1061-70. During the State's case in chief, Deputies Owen and Orvin
had testified that while defendant was barricaded in the building, he told the deputies that he
could shoot them, R. 935:309, or that "all you son-of-a-bitches should be dead," R. 931:530.
When defendant took the stand in his own defense, he denied making the remarks, explaining
that his "father-in-law is a police officer and another gentleman that [he] dearly care[s] about
12

is a police officer and [he] do[es] not harbor those feelings." R. 933: 912-13. To rebut that
claim, the State called Mrs. Felton. R. 933: 1061-70. She testified that in a conversation
with her husband and another neighbor some 30 to 40 minutes before the deputies arrival,
defendant remarked that the "only good cop is a dead cop." R. 933: 1068.
Although defendant later asked that he be allowed to recall Clayton Call to rebut Mrs.
Felton's testimony, he did not ask that he be allowed to call Ron Felton to rebut that
testimony as now claimed. See R. 933: 1106-09. Having failed to seek the rebuttal
testimony at trial, he cannot now complain on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to
permit the witness to testify. See State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Utah 1992)
(observing that defendant must "raise claims at the appropriate time at the trial level, so the
trial judge has an opportunity to rule on the issue"); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48,53 (Utah 1981)
(holding that "an appellate court will not rule on grounds not addressed in the trial court").
Defendant correctly notes that earlier at trial, after the State rested its case, he asked
that he be allowed to call Ron Felton as a witness in his case. See R. 931: 673. However,
contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, he did not seek to call Mr. Felton to rebut Mrs.
Felton's testimony—the State had not even called her as a witness at that point. See R. 935:
271-509; R. 931: 518-624. Rather, he wished to call Mr. Felton to rebut testimony from
Deputy Owen that defendant was agitated during his later encounter with the deputies on
Mrs. Felton's 9-1-1 call. R. 931: 673; see also 935: 284. The court, however, denied
defendant's request to call Mr. Felton. R. 931: 674. Where Mr. Felton was not present
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during defendant's encounter with the deputies, the court concluded that Mr. Felton's
testimony would be "too attenuated"fromthe incident itself. R. 931: 674.
Defendant complains that Sharon Felton was eventually called by the State as a
rebuttal witness and testified to that very issue. Aplt. Brf. at 19; see R. 933:1068 (testifying
that defendant "was very agitated. He was walking up and down the, the property with a
gun."). By this time, however, defendant had taken the witness stand and testified that
although he was "irritated" upon discovering that his property had been vandalized, any
anger or irritation had dissipated earlier that day and he was "totally calm" by the time the
deputies arrived. R. 933: 965-67, 979. Although the trial court had earlier ruled that
evidence of defendant's emotional state earlier that day was not relevant, defendant later
opened the door for the State to impeach his credibility and to rebut his evidence after
defendant testified to his earlier emotional state. Cf. State v. Squire, 888 P.2d 1102,1103-04
(Utah App. 1994) (holding that because defendant denied being a drug dealer and user, he
opened the door for the State to introduce evidence of a prior conviction).
Moreover, the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying testimony about
defendant's emotional state before the deputies' arrival. Although the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment grants a defendant the right to call witnesses in his favor,
see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,52,107 S.Ct. 2704,2709 (1987),4 that right is subject to

4

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
U.S. Const., amend. VI. This right is guaranteed in State criminal prosecutions by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rock, 483 U.S. at 52, 107 S.Ct. at 2709 (citing Washington, 388
U.S. at 17-19, 87 S.Ct. at 1922-1923).
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reasonable restrictions, see United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261,
1264 (1998). A violation of the Compulsory Process Clause does not occur unless "the
defendant was arbitrarily deprived of 'testimony [that] would have been relevant and
material,... and vital to the defense.'" United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858,
867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446 (1982) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16, 87 S.Ct.
1920,1922 (1967)) (brackets and emphasis in original); accord State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d
264, 274 (Utah 1985); State v. Byrns, 911 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah App. 1995).
In this case, the proposed testimony was neither relevant nor material. The State did
not seek to demonstrate that defendant was agitated at any time prior to the deputies' arrival.
See R. 931: 674. Nor did the State claim that defendant held a grudge against the deputies.
Accordingly, whether defendant was agitated 40 minutes before their arrival has no bearing
on whether he later threatened the deputies with his weapon. Moreover, defendant's own
witness, Clayton Call, testified that defendant was angry and agitated. R. 931: 768, 774.
And although defendant testified that he was totally calm by the time the deputies arrived,
he acknowledged that he was "irritated" with the sheriffs office and its deputies "because
[he] expected them to respond to [his] complaints [made earlier that day and on other
occasions] and they hadn't come." R. 933: 964-65. In light of defendant's own testimony
and that of Mr. Call, Mr. Felton's testimony was not material. That is, there is no
"reasonable probability that its presence would affect the outcome of trial." Schreuder, 712
P.2d at 275. Defendant's claim must therefore fail.
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B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.

Defendant also contends that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses
against him was violated. He generally argues that the trial court's time limitation on his
cross-examination of Deputy Orvin violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the
witness. See Aplt. Brf. at 23. This contention also fails.
1-

The Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation.

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const, amend. VI.
The Confrontation Clause does not simply ensure therightof the accused to physically face
those who testify against him, but it 6"secure[s] for the [accused] the opportunity of crossexamination.'" Davisv.Alaska,4l5U.S.30S,3l5-3l6,94S.Ct 1105,1110 (1974) (quoting
5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940)) (emphasis omitted). However, like
the Sixth Amendmentrightto call witnesses, the Sixth Amendmentrightof confrontation "is
not an absolute right." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474,479 (Utah 1990).
The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation only "guarantees an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish." Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15,20,106 S.Ct.
292,295 (1985) {per curiam) (emphasis in original). Thus, "trial judges retain wide latitude
insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on crossexamination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion
of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally
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relevant." Delawarev. VanArsdall,475U.S.673,679,106S.Ct.

1431,1435(1986);accord

State v. Chavez, 2002 UT App 9, f 19, 41 P.3d 1137.
To prevail on a confrontation claim, the defendant must "show[ ] that he was
prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby '[ ] expose to the jury the
facts from which jurors... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of
the witness.'" Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. at 1436 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at
318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111); accord Chavez, 2002 UT App 9, at \ 18. The Seventh Circuit has
articulated the inquiry on appeal as follows: The reviewing court must determine "whether
the restrictions that the [trial] court imposed on the defendant's cross-examination deprived
the defense of a meaningful opportunity to elicit available, relevant information that was
likely to impeach the credibility of the witness." United States v. Cameron, 814 F.2d 403,
406 (7th Cir. 1987). In other words, "[a] restriction imposed on cross-examination 'does not
violate the Confrontation Clause unless it limits relevant testimony and prejudices the
defendant.'" United States v. Marbella, 73 F.3d 1508,1513 (9th Cir.) (quoting United States
v. Shabani, 48 F.3d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1995)), cert, denied, 518 U.S. 1020,116 S.Ct. 2555
(1996).
Although Utah courts have not addressed the propriety of imposing time limits on
cross-examination, other jurisdictions have concluded that reasonable time limits do not
offend the Sixth Amendment. Seef e.g., United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270,1279 (9th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Vest, 116F.3d 1179, 1186-88 (7th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522
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U.S. 1119, 118 S.Ct. 1058 (199S); Marbella, 73 F.3d 1513 (9th Cir. 1996); People v. Ducu,
226 Cal.App.3d 1412, 1415, 277 Cal.Rptr. 464, 466 (Cal. App. 1991); Heald v. State, 492
N.E.2d 671,678 (Ind. 1986). The Seventh Circuit observed that the trial court should always
ensure that the defendant has had a "reasonable chance" to pursue the matters raised on direct
and to otherwise impeach the witness. See Vest, 116 F.3d at 1186. Thus, any time limits
imposed by the court should be treated "as guideposts rather than deadlines." Id. at 1187.
Whether a time limit is reasonable depends on the particulars of each case, including the
amount of time taken on direct, the complexity of issues involved, the productivity of crossexamination during the time given, the utility of further cross-examination, and even such
"imponderables as the judge's assessment of the jury's comprehension and attention span."
See id.5 In other words, the trial court "must exercise judgment in deciding when the point
of diminishing returns has been reached, or passed
2.

" Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Defendant Had Ample Opportunity to Cross-examine Deputy Orvin.

Defendant here has not demonstrated that the time limit imposed by the trial court was
unreasonable or that it otherwise deprived him of an opportunity to conduct effective crossexamination. He does not identify what relevant matters he was precluded from exploring
as a result of the time limitation, much less describe how he was prejudiced thereby. See

5

See also Ducu, 226 Cal.App.3d at 1415,277 Cal.Rptr. at 466 (noting that trial
court gave defense "at least as much time to conduct his cross-examination as he gave to
the district attorney for direct"); Marbella, 73 F.3d at 1513 (noting that cross-examination
had already undermined the witnesses' recollection of events and that additional
questioning would be unproductive); United States v. Malik, 928 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir.
1991) (observing that the relevancy of the proposed additional cross-examination was not
clear at the time of trial and its impeachment value was small in any event).
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Marbella, 73 F.3d at 1513. His claim must therefore fail as nothing but a bald assertion. See
State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah App. 1998) (recognizing the well-established
principle that "a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed").
A review on the merits also reveals that the trial court's time limit was reasonable.
Length of Direct Examination. The prosecutor questioned Deputy Orvin on direct for
approximately 34 minutes over the course of two days. R. 688 (count 4:26 - 4:41); R. 682
(count 8:49 - 9:08). Defendant then cross-examined Deputy Orvin for approximately 50
minutes before the trial court ordered a recess. See R. 682-83 (9:25 - 10:15); R. 931: 583.6
During the recess, the court advised defendant that he would be permitted to cross-examine
Deputy Orvin for an additional 30 minutes. R. 931: 583. The time allotted for crossexamination of Deputy Orvin was thus more than twice that used for direct examination.
Complexity of Issues. The 80-minute time period for cross-examination of Deputy
Orvin gave defendant more than enough time "to elicit available, relevant information"
designed to impeach the officer's credibility. Cameron, 814 F.2d at 406, The issues at trial
were neither complex nor difficult to develop or present. Deputy Orvin was not required to
explain complex procedures or provide special expertise. Like Deputy Owen, he simply
recounted the events that transpired in the late afternoon of April 9,1996. The jury was thus
faced with the straightforward task of determining whether or not to believe the deputy's
account of the incident.
6

The trial court remarked that defendant had questioned Deputy Orvin for the same
amount of time as did the prosecutor, but included in that calculus the 17-minute
discussion outside the presence of the jury on the admissibility of defendant's statement
at the jail. See R. 931: 583; see also R. 682 (9:08-9:22); R. 931: 535-43.
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Productivity of Cross-examination and Utility of Further Questioning. Although
defendant explored some relevant issues during cross-examination, he spent needless time
on issues that at best were only marginally relevant. The day before, defendant's crossexamination of Deputy Owen was dominated by questions of little to no relevance and
persisted three times as long as the State's direct examination of him. See generally R. 935:
324-498; compare R. 687 (53 minutes: 10:09-10:31; 10:51-11:22), with R. 687-88 (162
minutes: 11:22-11:40; 12:04-12:22; 1:39-3:00; 3:30-4:15). To avoid a similar outcome, the
court ordered a brief recess after 50 minutes of cross-examination of Deputy Orvin and
instructed defendant that he would be limited to 30 more minutes of cross-examination. The
court, however, indicated that additional time would nevertheless be permitted if defendant
demonstrated that he had used the 30 minutes for relevant questioning and additional time
was necessary to flesh out other significant matters. R. 931: 585.
During the first 50 minutes of cross-examination, defendant had explored a few
relevant issues—e.g., the visibility of defendant's gun, the timing and circumstances of the
assault, and a possible motive toframedefendant. See R. 931: 546-57, 576-83. However,
he spent undue time probing into minutiae as he did the day before with Deputy Owen—e.g.,
asking for detailed explanations about the deputies' arrival on the scene, the layout of the
property, the positions of the cars, the characteristics of the fence, and the types of animals
on the property. R. 931: 558-75. During the next 30 minutes, he also explored a few
relevant issues, including the details of defendant's retreat to the building, the brief standoff,
and defendant's surrender, R. 931: 589,592-97,604-05,610. He also elicited testimony that
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Deputy Orvin's primary focus was on Clayton Call and Deputy Owen rather than defendant,
R. 931: 586. However, notwithstanding the court's warning to use his time wisely, he used
nearly half of the 30 minutes exploring matters of little to no relevance. For example, he
asked Deputy Orvin to identify the color of defendant's holster and the color of the clothing
worn by defendant and Call. R. 931: 587-88, 597-98. He quizzed Deputy Orvin on such
picayune details as how close the deputy was to the building, R. 931: 604, the manner in
which the deputy ducked down for cover when defendant pointed the gun at him, R. 931:
605-07, and the nature and relative positioning of the debris in the room where defendant was
barricaded, R. 931: 598, 601-03, 611-12. He spent additional time revisiting the positions
of the cars and the distances between those involved and the cars. R. 931: 589-92.
Moreover, in an impermissible attempt to challenge the deputies' authority to be on the
property, defendant elicited testimony from Deputy Orvin that defendant had ordered the
deputies off the property as trespassers because they had no warrant. See R. 931: 607-09.
Time Limit Extended. After 30 minutes of cross-examination, the court told defendant
that he had reached his time limit. R. 931: 613. However, the court did not insist on strict
adherence to the time limit, but permitted defendant to ask additional questions concerning
the details of his surrender. R. 931: 613-14. Only after it became evident that additional
time would not result in relevant questioning did the trial court terminate cross-examination.
As in Vest, the court's "decision to end cross-examination only after concluding that
[defendant] was wasting time with repetitive [and irrelevant] questions shows the necessary
particularized judgment necessary for limiting cross-examination." 116 F.3d at 1187.
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In summary, because defendant covered the issues raised on direct, spending more
than twice the amount of time on cross-examination as the prosecutor used on direct, and
given the simplicity of the issues and defendant's insistence to focus on matters of little or
no relevance, it cannot be said that the time limit "prevented] the jury from making a
discriminating appraisal of the witness' testimony." Vest, 116 F.3d 1188-89 (internal quotes
omitted). Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that defendant's cross-examination
of Deputy Orvin had passed the point of diminishing returns and his claim on appeal must
therefore fail. See id. at 1187.
3.

The Trial Court's Refusal to Permit a Demonstration Using a
Garbage Can Did Not Preclude Defendant from Eliciting the Desired
Testimony.

Defendant contends, however, that he was denied his right to confront the witness
when the trial court did not permit Deputy Orvin to step down from the witness stand and
demonstrate, using a garbage can admitted as a demonstrative exhibit, how the gun was
placed on the garbage can in the building. Aplt. Brf. at 21-22. The court's refusal to permit
the demonstration did not violate defendant's right of confrontation for two reasons. First,
the relevancy of the gun's positioning on the garbage can is not apparent and defendant has
failed to explain any. Second, defendant was in fact permitted to elicit the desired testimony,
albeit not in the manner he wished. See Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20,106 S.Ct. at 295 (holding
that the accused is not entitled to "cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and
to whatever extent, the defense might wish"). The court permitted Deputy Orvin to explain
how the gun was laid down on the garbage can. See R. 931:616. And when defendant again
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insisted that a demonstration was necessary, the court permitted Deputy Orvin to so
demonstrate on the witness stand. R. 931: 616 ("If you want to ask the witness in what
position the weapon was laid I'll have him demonstrate that here."). The trial judge thus
provided defendant with more than an adequate opportunity to demonstrate how the gun was
laid down. A demonstration on the garbage can itself would have added nothing to the
testimony. Defendant's failure to take advantage of that opportunity, insisting instead on a
demonstration using the garbage can, R. 931: 617, cannot be attributed to the court.
II.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION FOR USING A CONCEALED FIREARM IN THE
COMMISSION OF A CRIME OF VIOLENCE
Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict
that defendant was guilty of carrying a concealed weapon in the commission of a crime of
violence. Aplt. Brf. at 23-25. Defendant's claim fails for two reasons.
First, defendant's claim fails because he assigns a greater culpable mental state for the
offense than is required. Without citing any authority, defendant asserts that the State was
required to prove that defendant "knowingly and intentionally" concealed the pistol. Aplt.
Brf. at 23. However, because the concealed weapons statute does not specify a culpable
mental state, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1995), the State was only required to
prove "intent, knowledge, or recklessness." Utah Code Ann. § 67-2-102 (1995) (emphasis
added). Defendant's claim thus fails because he challenges only the sufficiency of the
evidence with respect to an intentional mental state. He does not challenge the sufficiency
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of the evidence with respect to a knowing or reckless mental state, either of which are
sufficient for afindingof criminal liability.
Second, defendant's claim fails in any event because he ignores the evidence
supporting afindingof intentional conduct. Although Deputy Owen testified that he did not
believe defendant intentionally concealed the gun, he subsequently clarified that he did not
believe defendant was intentionally concealing the weapon "as far as [he] could tell to start
with." R. 935: 468. Moreover, Deputy Owen's belief at the time regarding defendant's
mental state was speculative and not dispositive of the issue. Unless a defendant admits to
his intention, criminal intent is not susceptible of direct proof and must "be inferredfromthe
actions of the defendant or from surrounding circumstances." State v. Murphy, 61A P.2d
1220, 1223 (Utah 1983); accord State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 152 n.4 (Utah App. 1997)
(observing that because "[t]here is rarely direct evidence of something as intangible as
'intent,'" proof thereof "is invariably a matter of inference to be drawn by the factfinder from
all the evidence"). Thus, as against what any witness may testify, "it is the jury's privilege
to weigh and consider all of the other facts and circumstances shown in evidence in
determining what they will believe." State v. Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377,378,453 P.2d 696,
697 (Utah 1969) (referring to a defendant's testimony).
Both deputies testified that the weapon was concealed under defendant's shirt when
they arrived, R. 935: 281-82; R. 931: 520-21, and even defendant's own witness, Clayton
Call, allowed that the weapon may have been partially concealed, R. 931: 726-27. Thus,
where defendant openly admitted that he was carrying his gun in the holster, R. 931: 800, the
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jury may reasonably infer that by wearing his shirt out, defendant intended that the gun be
concealed. That evidence alone was sufficient to support a finding of intent. See Peterson,
22 Utah 2d at 378,453 P.2d 697 (recognizing "the elementary rule that a person is presumed
to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts"); accord State v. Sisneros, 631
P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1981).
Other evidence introduced at trial, ignored by defendant on appeal, was even more
convincing of an intent to conceal. On direct examination by defendant, Clayton Call
testified that defendant wore his shirts "[a]lways tucked in." R. 931: 731. Likewise, Sharon
Felton testified that defendant normally wore his shirts tucked in and that defendant was in
fact wearing his shirt tucked in on the day of the assault. R. 933: 1066-67. However, she
testified that shortly before the deputies arrived, defendant pulled his shirt up and over his
gun. R. 933: 1067-70. Where Clayton Call had just advised defendant of the deputies'
impending arrival, see R. 933: 959-60; R. 931: 722-24, Sharon Felton's testimony that
defendant pulled his shirt up and over the gun creates a strong inference that defendant
intentionally concealed the weapon from the deputies. Accordingly, the evidence was not
"completely lacking or [ ] so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
unreasonable and unjust" State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, f 19, 999 P.2d 565 {quoting Child v.
Gonda, 972 P.2d 425,433 (Utah 1998)).
Defendant also asserts for the first time on appeal that because the assault on the
officers did not occur until after he had exposed the firearm, the evidence was insufficient
to demonstrate that he used the concealed firearm "in the commission o f the crime. Aplt.
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Brf. at 24-25. As defendant acknowledges, he did not raise this claim below and must
therefore demonstrate plain error. See State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989)
(holding that appellants must show plain error on issues raised for the first time on appeal).
In essence, defendant argues that by its plain terms the statute requires that
concealment of the weapon be contemporaneous with the commission of the violent crime.
Under that logic, however, a concealed weapons offense can almost never occur if the
concealed weapon itself is used to commit the crime of violence—some other instrument
would have to be used. Such a reading of the statute is Unreasonably confused [and]
inoperable." State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, f 45, 989 P.2d 1091 (internal quotes
omitted). To the contrary, a reasonable reading of the statute presumes that the concealed
weapon is subsequently exposed to commit the crime of violence.
In any event, where, as here, "the trial court did not have the benefit of an appellate
decision interpreting the statute's requirement/' the error cannot be deemed obvious.
Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 36; accord State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,239 (Utah App. 1997) (holding
that "a trial court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial
court").
III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO MERGE THE
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CONVICTIONS WITH THE CONCEALED
WEAPON CONVICTION
Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995), defendant next contends that the trial
court erred in refusing to merge the aggravated assault convictions with the concealed

26

weapon conviction. Aplt. Brf. at 25-27. Defendant argues that "he could not have
committed the second-degree felony concealed weapon offense without necessarily having
committed the offense of aggravated assault

because the second degree felony concealed

weapon offense... requires that the concealed weapon be used in the commission of a crime
of violence or in this case during the course of an aggravated assault(s)." Aplt. Brf. at 26.
Under section 76-1-402(3), a defendant "may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and [an] included offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1995). Accordingly,
"a lesser included offense must be merged into a greater offense if the defendant could not
have committed the greater without having necessarily committed the lesser." State v.
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f 59, — Utah Adv. Rep — (citing State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70,89
(Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996),
and State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301,1313 (Utah 1986)); accord State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152,
156 (Utah 1983).
In State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that in
determining whether a greater-lesser relationship exists between offenses requiring merger,
the court must "comparje] the statutory elements of the two crimes as a theoretical matter
and, where necessary, by reference to the facts proved at trial." Hill, 61A P.2d at 97; accord
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, at f 59.
In State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court
added to the Hill analysis in determining whether a greater-lesser relationship existed
between second degree felony murder and its predicate offense of aggravated assault. In that
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case, the defendant was convicted of second degree felony murder and aggravated robbery.
803 P.2d at 1234. Because the aggravated robbery was the predicate offense of second
degree felony murder, defendant argued that his aggravated robbery conviction should have
merged with his felony murder conviction. Id.
Under the felony murder statute in effect at the time, a criminal homicide constituted
murder in the second degree if the actor committed criminal homicide "while in the
commission, attempted commission, or immediateflightfromthe commission or attempted
commission o f certain specified crimes, including aggravated robbery. See id. at 1236-37.
Applying the Hill analysis, McCovey observed that "[u]nder a strict theoretical comparison,
aggravated robbery . . . . does qualify [as a lesser included offense] under . . . the felony
murder rule." Id. at 1237. And under a factual comparison, "[i]t [was] undisputed that all
elements of aggravated robbery were proven at trial and that [the defendant] was convicted
of the crime." Id. It was likewise undisputed "that the murder took place during the
commission of aggravated robbery." Id. The Court thus acknowledged that "under the Hill
analysis aggravated robbery would be a lesser included offense of felony murder." Id.
Although aggravated robbery appeared to meet the requirements of a lesser included
offense under the Hill analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that it was not a lesser included
offense. In so concluding, the Court identified a third step for determining whether a greaterlesser relationship exists requiring merger—"a determination of whether the legislature
intended aggravated robbery to be a lesser included offense of second degree felony murder."
Id. at 1235. The Court concluded that "the Utah State Legislature did not intend the multiple
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crimes of felony murder to be punished as a single crime, but rather, that the homicide be
enhanced to second degree felony murder in addition to the underlying felony. Id. at 1239
(emphasis added).
In determining the intent of the legislature, the Court first "recognize[d] that
enhancement statutes are different in nature than other criminal statutes." Id. at 1237. The
Court also observed that "[aggravated robbery does not, by its nature, have overlapping
elements with any traditional form of murder." Id. at 1237. Finally, the Court "considered]
the nature and purpose of the felony murder statute." Id. at 1238. The Court observed that
one of the purposes of the statute was to dispense with the requirement of showing a culpable
mental state where a death occurs during the commission of a felony. Id. However, the
Court focused on another purpose of the statute—"to deter the use offeree or weapons in the
commission of a felony." Id. The Court reasoned:
If a felon knows that a homicide committed during the commission of a felony,
whether accidental or unintentional, will be treated as a first degree felony in
addition to the underlying felony being committed, he or she will be less apt
to use deadly force or dangerous weapons. Conversely, if the legislature
intended to make the underlying felony a lesser included offense, then a felon
could receive a two-for-one windfall by convincing the jury that the homicide
was unintentional or accidental.
Id. at 1239. The Court concluded that the legislature could not have intended to create such
a windfall. Id.
The Court acknowledged that its decision was in apparent conflict with State v.
Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), which held that the aggravating offenses that enhance
second degree murder to first degree murder are lesser included offenses of first degree
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murder. McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1237-38. However, the Court in McCovey noted that first
degree murder is distinguishable from second degree murder in that first degree murder is
punishable by death or life imprisonment. Id. at 1238. As such, imposing a punishment for
the aggravating offense would add nothing to the punishment. Id. In contrast, second degree
felony murder carries a punishment offiveyears to life and the Court thus held that "it would
not be needless or surplusage to consider the underlying felony as a separate offense." Id.1
As a predicate to the second degree felony offense of carrying a concealed weapon,
aggravated assault has the "same or less than all" of the elements of the concealed weapons
crime. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a) (1995); McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1237.
Moreover, and as discussed above, all the elements of aggravated assault were proven at trial
and defendant was thus convicted of both counts. As also discussed above, defendant used
the concealed weapon in the commission of the aggravated assaults. Thus, under the Hill
analysis alone, aggravated assault would be a lesser included offense of the second degree
felony crime of carrying a concealed weapon. However, as in McCovey, resolution of the
issue is not reached simply by a comparison of the elements under the Hill analysis, but
"requires a determination of whether the legislature intended [aggravated assault and the
other aggravating crimes] to be [ ] lesser included offensefs] of [carrying a concealed weapon
in the commission of a violent crime]." See McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1235.
7

The Court also noted that in McCovey the victim of the robbery was the video
store and the victim of the murder was a customer, whereas in Shaffer the victim of the
robbery and the victim of the murder were the same person. McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1238.
This distinction, however, bore no relevance to the Court's overriding conclusion that the
legislature did not intend that the predicate offenses of second degree felony murder be
considered lesser included offenses.
30

Section 76-10-504 makes it unlawful for a person to carry a concealed firearm without
a valid concealed firearm permit. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(l)(b) (Supp. 1995). The
statute provides that it is a class B misdemeanor if the firearm does not contain ammunition
and a class A misdemeanor if thefirearmcontains ammunition. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10504( 1 )(b) (Supp. 1995). However, the statute enhances the offense to a second degree felony
"[i]f the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a crime of violence as defined in
Section 76-10-501, and the person is a party to the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3)
(Supp. 1995). Thus, like the second degree felony murder statute considered in McCovey,
the second degree felony provision for carrying a concealed weapon is an enhancement
statute, "different in nature than other criminal statutes." See McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1237.
Moreover, just as "[aggravated robbery does not, by its nature, have overlapping elements
with any traditional form of murder," Id. at 1237, aggravated assault does not, by its nature,
have overlapping elements with any traditional form of carrying a concealed weapon. These
factors suggest that the legislature did not intend that the aggravating crimes be lesser
included offenses of the enhanced concealed weapons offense.
Moreover, the general purpose of the concealed weapons statute "is to protect the
public by preventing an individual from having on hand a weapon of which the public is
unaware and which the individual might use should he be so inclined." State v. Williams,
63 6 P.2d 1092,1094 (Utah 1981). A concealed weapon may pose varying degrees of danger
depending on the circumstances.

Undoubtedly recognizing this fact, the legislature

designated three different levels of punishment depending on the risk posed by the
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circumstances. For example, a concealed weapon containing ammunition represents a
greater danger to the public than one without ammunition. Accordingly, a violation of the
statute under the former circumstances is punishable as a class A misdemeanor rather than
a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. §76-10-504(1) (Supp. 1995). And because the
danger to the public increases exponentially when a concealed weapon is actually used in a
crime of violence, the legislature made a violation of the statute a second degree felony under
those circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3) (Supp. 1995). As with felony
murder, see McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1238, the legislature did not thus envision any lesser
punishment for the predicate offenses. It simply sought to deter the more dangerous conduct
by imposing a more severe punishment.
That the legislature did not intend aggravated assault to be a lesser included offense
becomes apparent when the list of offenses that qualify as an aggravator under the statute is
considered. Like aggravated assault, most of the predicate offenses under the statute carry
equal or lighter punishments. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1995) (manslaughter),
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105 (1995) (mayhem), Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (1995)
(kidnapping), Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 1995) (robbery), Utah Code Ann. § 76-6202 (1995) (burglary), and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1995) (extortion). However,
murder, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1996), and rape, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402
(1995), are both,firstdegree felonies, and aggravated murder, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202
(Supp. 1996), is a capital offense. If, as defendant suggests, the aggravating crimes for the
enhanced concealed weapons offense are included offenses, then not only would the "lesser
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included" offense of aggravated assault merge, but so would the "greater included" offenses
of rape, murder, and aggravated murder. Surely, the legislature did not intend such a result,
but intended to punish the underlying felony as well.
In summary, reason dictates that the legislature did not intend the multiple crimes of
section 76-10-504(3) to be punished as a single crime, but rather, that the concealed weapon
offense be enhanced to a second degree felony in addition to the underlying felony. Cf.
McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1239) (using similar language in the context of second degree felony
murder). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to merge the aggravated assault
convictions with the second degree felony concealed weapon conviction.8
IV.
DEFENDANT HAS SHOWN NEITHER PLAIN ERROR NOR
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR THE LACK OF A
LESSER INCLUDED INSTRUCTION ON THREATENING WITH A
DANGEROUS WEAPON
Defendant complains, for the first time on appeal, that the jury was not given an
instruction on threatening with a dangerous weapon, Utah Code Ann. £76-10-506 (1995),
as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Aplt. Brf. at 28-29, 32-36. Because his
attorney did not request an instruction for threatening with a dangerous weapon, and because
the trial court did not give the instruction sua sponte, defendant rests his claim on both

Even if this Court were to conclude that an aggravated assault conviction merges
with a second degree felony concealed weapons conviction, only one of the two
aggravated assault convictions would merge. See Wood, 868 P.2d at 90 (observing that
"it makes no sense . . . to merge both convictions when the law requires only one
predicate offense").
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ineffective assistance of counsel, Aplt. Brf. at 32-36, and plain error, Aplt. Brf. at 28-29. For
the reasons explained below, defendant's claim fails.
A.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND PLAIN ERROR ANALYSES.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant must meet the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). Under the Strickland test, defendant "must
meet the heavy burden of showing that (1) trial counsel rendered deficient performance
which fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2)
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah
1998) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,104 S.Ct. at 2064) (other citations omitted). To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, "the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial
strategy.5" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,104 S.Ct. at 2065 (citation omitted). A conviction
will not be reversed for ineffective assistance unless "'there was a "lack of any conceivable
tactical basis" for counsel's actions.'" State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App.
1997) (quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v.
Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688,692 (Utah. App.1989)); accord Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870,
876 (Utah 1993) (holding that it will not find ineffectiveness unless there is "no reasonable
basis" for making the decision).
Plain Error. "A party who fails to raise an issue with the trial court is generally
barred from raising that issue for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed
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plain error." Bluff, 2002 UT 66, at % 25. To establish plain error, defendant must show that
"(i) an error was made, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) the
error was harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a more favorable outcome was
reasonably likely." State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, f 9,9 P.3d 164 (citing State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)). Like an ineffectiveness claim, however, this Court will not
save the defendantfromany alleged error if defendant made a conscious decision not to seek
the relief or otherwise led the trial court into error. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, at % 25. The
defendant, therefore, must not only demonstrate that the error was obvious, but also that the
decision not to seek the relief "would serve no conceivable strategic purpose." State v.
Labrum, 925 P.2d937, 939 (Utah 1996).
B.

DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF BASED ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL OR PLAIN ERROR BECAUSE A DECISION NOT TO REQUEST A LESSER
INCLUDED INSTRUCTION IS A REASONABLE TACTICAL CHOICE.

In support of his claim of both ineffective assistance and plain error, defendant relies
on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984). Aplt.
Brf. at 28-29, 32-33. However, in Oldroyd the defendant asked the trial court for an
instruction on the lesser included offense of threatening with a dangerous weapon, but that
request was denied. Id. at 553. Oldroyd held that the court's refusal to give the instruction
was error under the circumstances of that case. Id. at 554-56. Oldroyd did not address a
failure to give the instruction where none was requested as is the case here and is therefore
inapposite. Because this Court will not reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance
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or plain error where there is a strategic basis for counsel's decision, whether defendant was
entitled to such an instruction is not at issue before the Court here.
It is in fact conceivable that the defense made a deliberate and tactical choice not to
request the lesser included instruction. Defendant maintained throughout trial that he never
aimed his gun at the deputies or otherwise used it in a threatening manner, but simply tried
to remove it to comply with Deputy Owen's instructions. Thus, to acquit defendant of the
aggravated assault charges, the jury must have believed defendant's account of the incident,
and have completely disregarded the testimony of the deputies and Mrs. Felton. An
instruction on the lesser included offense could have only provided the jury with another
basis to render a guilty verdict, albeit a class A misdemeanor rather than a third degree
felony, and would in all probability not have affected the jury's willingness to give credence
to the deputies' testimony which established the aggravated assault. Therefore, the defense
strategy of not requesting the jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of threatening
with a weapon was suited to the defendant's theory of the case. It is also reasonable to
believe that defendant would rather force the jury to choose between guilt and acquittal than
risk giving the jury an option to "split the baby."
Because defendant has not demonstrated that a decision not to ask for an instruction
on the lesser included offense "would serve no conceivable strategic purpose," both his
ineffectiveness claim and his plain error claim fail. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 939 (applying plain
error analysis); accord Winward, 941 P.2d at 635 (applying ineffective assistance analysis).
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The apparent decision not to request the instruction neither constituted an unprofessional
error, nor did it effect any demonstrably prejudicial impact on the outcome of the trial.9
V.
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT BASED
ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In his final point on appeal, defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective for
not alleging as a basis for his motion for a directed verdict the failure of the State to introduce
evidence that defendant did not have a concealed weapons permit. Aplt. Brf. at 31-32. As
discussed above, to prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must not only show that
trial counsel performed deficiently, but also that the deficient performance prejudiced him.
Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50. Where, as here, "it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim
on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,... that course should be followed." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 697,104 S.Ct. at 2069; accord State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50,61 (Utah 1993)

defendant also argues that the holding in State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450 (Utah 1984)
makes "the obviousness of the trial court's error [ ] even more apparent." Aplt. Brf. at 29,
33. As explained above, however, whether the law entitled defendant to the lesser
included instruction, no matter how well-settled, is not the determinative issue when there
is a sound tactical basis for not requesting the instruction. In any event, the Supreme
Court has observed that "[t]he distinctions in levels of proscribed conduct [between
aggravated assault and threatening with a dangerous weapon] are clear and easily to be
comprehended." State v. Verdin, 595 P.2d 862, 862 (Utah 1979). At the very worst, it
would appear that contrary to defendant's claim, the more specific statute is aggravated
assault—which requires a specific threat to do bodily injury to another with a dangerous
weapon, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995), not threatening with a dangerous
weapon—which generally requires the display of a weapon in an angry and threatening
manner or in afight,see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1995).
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("reiterat[ing] that [the Court] need not address both components if a defendant fails to meet
his or her burden on either one").
To meet the prejudice prong, defendant must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,694,104 S.Ct. at 2064,2068. Defendant
contends that because the State introduced no evidence that he did not have a concealed
weapons permit, the trial court "would have had to dismiss Count I because no evidence had
been introduced by the State that he lacked a valid permit." Aplt. Brf. at 35. That
contention, however, assumes that the State would not have been allowed to reopen its case
and introduce the necessary evidence. The assumption is not valid.
Utah courts have long recognized that a trial court may permit the State to reopen its
case to meet an insufficiency challenge. For example, in State v. Gregorious, 81 Utah 33,
16 P.2d 893 (1932), the defendant was charged with having committed an infamous crime
against nature. The State rested its case after calling as its only witness an accomplice to the
crime. Id. at 894-95. Citing the rule that a conviction could not be sustained based on the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, the defendant moved for a directed verdict for
insufficient evidence. Id. at 895. Rather than granting defendant's motion, the trial court
granted the State's request to reopen the case so that it could call a witness who could
provide the corroborating testimony. Id. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
holding that "[i]t was within the discretion of the court to permit the case to be reopened."
Id.
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In State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323,234 P.2d 600 (1951), the State charged defendant
with grand larceny, but failed to put on any evidence of the value of the stolen car. Id. at
325-26, 234 P.2d at 601. Rather than moving to reopen the case, the State asked the trial
court to take judicial notice that the car's value exceeded the grand larceny requirements.
Id. at 326,234 P.2d at 601. The court denied the motion for a directed verdict and instructed
the jury that it must "'take the value of this property as being in excess of $50.00 and
therefore the defendant, if he is guilty at all, is guilty of grand larceny.'" Id. In holding that
the trial court erred in so instructing the jury, the Supreme Court observed that "[t]he State's
attorney might properly and with little difficulty have moved to reopen and supply the
missing evidence." Id.
In State v. Seel 827 P.2d 954 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992),
this Court also acknowledged the State's ability to reopen its case to introduce evidence
necessary for a conviction. After the State rested, the trial court in Seel orally dismissed the
possession of a firearm charge against the defendant because no evidence had been
introduced that he knew the pistol was in the vehicle. Id. at 957. However, the court then
granted the State's motion to reopen the case so that it could introduce the missing evidence.
Id. After hearing the additional testimony, the court reinstated the firearm charge and the
jury found defendant guilty. Id. at 957-58. On appeal, defendant argued that hisrightagainst
double jeopardy was violated because the firearm charge had been dismissed by the trial
court. Id. at 962. Noting that the order had not been reduced to writing, and citing
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Gregorious, the court of appeals held that "the trial court's decision to allow the State to
reopen the evidence was not plain error." Id.10
Thus, even had defendant's counsel here moved for a directed verdict based on a lack
of evidence that defendant did not have a concealed weapons permit, the State could have
"properly and with little difficulty [ ] moved to reopen and supply the missing evidence."
Lawrence, 120 Utah at 326, 234 P.2d at 601. As acknowledged by defendant on appeal,
Aplt. Brf. at 31-32, he admitted on cross-examination that he did not have and never has had
a concealed weapons permit. See R. 933: 961. That testimony was, in fact, consistent with
defendant's position throughout the proceedings. See, e.g., R. 297 (alleging that no permit
was required to possess a firearm on place of residence or business); R. 332 (same); R. 486
(same); R. 513-14 (contending that it is legal to carry a concealed firearm at your residence,
property, or business and summarizing the State's burden as threefold: (1) that the firearm
was concealed, (2) that a crime was committed before defendant exposed the firearm, and
(3) that the firearm was exposed "from a hiding place to a position of assault at the very
10

See also McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321, 324 (Utah 1983) (suggesting that
prosecutor could have moved to reopen the case and recall the witnesses to clarify the 17day discrepancy as to when the thefts occurred). Other jurisdictions have also
acknowledged that the State may reopen its case to meet an insufficiency challenge. See,
e.g., Barnett v. State, 244 Ga.App. 585, 587 n.2, 536 S.E.2d 263,267 n.2 (Ga. App. 2000)
(observing that "it is well settled that a trial court has discretion to reopen the evidence
after the State has rested and the defendant has moved for a directed verdict"), cert,
denied (Jan 5,2001); People v. Whipple, 734 N.Y.S.2d 549, 553 (N.Y. App. 2001)
(holding that "where . . . the missing element is simple to prove and not seriously
contested, and reopening the case does not unduly prejudice the defense, a court may, in
its discretion, grant a motion to reopen"); State v. Howard, 320 N.C. 718, 724, 360 S.E.2d
790, 794 (N.C. 1987) (holding that "[t]he trial judge has the discretionary power to permit
the introduction of additional evidence after a party has rested its case, and can reopen a
case for additional testimony after arguments to the jury have begun").
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moment of exposure"). Because defendant had implicitly admitted to not having the permit,
the State reasonably assumed that the matter was not disputed. See Lawrence, 120 Utah at
327,234 P.2d at 601 (in holding that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice regarding
the value of the stolen car, the Court observed that it "was not a case where the defendant
either expressly or impliedly admitted the value, nor by conduct or statements of himself or
counsel, allowed it to be assumed that the matter was not disputed"). Had defendant
suddenly disputed that fact by filing a motion for a directed verdict, that motion would have
inevitably been followed by a motion to reopen the case for the admission of evidence that
defendant did not have the required permit. Accordingly, any failure by defense counsel to
move for a directed verdict was not prejudicial.
In any event, this Court will "not countenance an argument that turns on a defendant
having lost the opportunity to take a position at trial not consistent with the truth." See State
v. Lavadour, 2001 UT App 328 n.l (memorandum decision) (reproduced in Addendum B).
Therefore, where defendant had implicitly conceded throughout the proceedings that he did
not have a concealed weapons permits, and chose not to dispute that fact at trial, but rather
to admit it, he cannot complain on appeal that his counsel failed to take a position
inconsistent with both the truth and his strategic decision not to dispute the fact. See also
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,104 S.Ct. at 2065 (holding that "defendant must overcome the
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presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound
trial strategy.'") (citations omitted).11
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted this |c? day of August, 2002.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

iY S. GRAY
DISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Appellee

1

'Moreover, it is far from clear that the State is required to produce evidence that a
defendant does not have a concealed weapons permit where the defendant never claims to
have a permit. See, e.g., State v. Bowdry, 337 N.W.2d 216,218-19 (Iowa 1983)
(concluding that "where no demand for a permit is made at the scene and no permit is
produced there or at trial, the issue of a permit is not in the case unless substantial
evidence appears in the record from some quarter—that the person had a valid permit at
the time"). Indeed, the permit issue is more appropriately treated as an affirmative
defense requiring the defendant to first raise the issue.
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const amend, VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (3) (1995)
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1995)
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsections (2) and
(3):
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon which is not a
firearm on his person or one that is readily accessible for immediate use which
is not securely encased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his
residence, property, or business under his control is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit who carries a
concealed dangerous weapon which is a firearm and that contains no
ammunition is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains
ammunition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2)...;
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a violent felony
as defined in Section 76-10-501, and the person is a party to the offense, the
person is guilty of a second degree felony.
(4)....

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann, S 76-10-506 (1995^
Every person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503, who,
not in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or
exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or
unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
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ORME, Judge:
Even if we were to hold that appellant's confession was the
product of police coercion, we would be unable to escape the
conclusion that, due to the strength of other evidence
identifying appellant as the robber, the trial court's admission
of the confession into evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt- See Arizona v. Fulminante. 499 U.S. 279, 306-312, 111 S.
Ct. 1246, 1263-66 (1991).
It was particularly damaging that appellant's two
accomplices identified him as one of the two individuals who
entered the store and as the one who played the lead role in
committing the robbery. Benally's trial testimony was cogent and
credible. The fact that Benally and appellant are first cousins
dispels any possibility that Benally did not really know
appellant and, in the absence of any indication the relationship
between the two was strained, substantially undercuts any
suggestion that Benally framed an innocent third-party.
In addition, appellant's trial counsel conceded that
appellant was in the store attempting to steal beer on the
evening in question. In presenting his client's version of the
events at trial, defense counsel explained: "All Mr. Lavadour

wanted was beer. He grabbed it. They ran out. Some clerk
stepped in the way. He pulled out a cigarette lighter." When
these comments are viewed in combination with the testimony of
the two store clerks and the testimony of Benally, it becomes
clear there was ample evidence to sustain appellant's conviction,
completely independent of his confession.1
Affirmed.

Gregory-It. Orme, Judge
s

WE CONCUR:
I * sMt

*

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Wi 1 11 am A. Thome, Jr. r Judge

1. Insofar as appellant suggests that but for his confession,
events would have taken a completely different course, we note
that Benally's and Gonzales's identification of him predated the
confession and thus were not in any way tainted by it. If
appellant is suggesting that had the confession been suppressed,
he would have taken a different tack at trial rather than admit
he was at the store trying to steal beer, his argument is highly
speculative, especially given Benally's testimony. Moreover, we
are unwilling to countenance an argument that turns on a
defendant having lost the opportunity to take a position at trial
not consistent with the truth.
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